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BACKGROUND – LEARNING THE HARD WAY
The fight against terrorism has historically been a 
member state competence. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism  
was not carried out within the EU’s institutional 
framework. In response to the London bombings of  
7 July 2005, the United Kingdom (UK), which was then 
holding the Presidency of the EU Council, drafted what 
would ultimately become the “European Union Counter-
Terrorism Strategy”, adopted in December 2005.1 
The strategy has four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and 
respond. Across these pillars, the strategy recognises the 
importance of cooperation between member states as 
well as with third countries and international institutions. 
Since then, Europe has been the victim of several devastating 
terrorist attacks. While some were intricate, planned and 
executed by organised terrorist cells, others were lone-wolf 
attacks. They represented a wake-up call for Europe, revealing 
the existence of dormant cells and individuals silently 
nurturing a hatred against our system and its values, and 
ready to act in the presence of the right triggers.
The attacks also exposed a number a deficiencies in 
EU counter-terrorism policy. This included a lack of 
information and intelligence sharing across member 
states. However, possibly the greatest shortcoming was 
the lack of investment in preventative measures to stop 
vulnerable individuals from becoming radicalised in the 
first place. Building up the resilience of communities 
and the capacities of local actors and groups within 
communities to fight radicalisation, along with working 
with role models who are admired and taken seriously by 
people, particularly youth, is crucial.
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There has been a shift away from hard 
security measures to a more holistic 
approach to strengthen the resilience  
of vulnerable communities and work  
with grassroots organisations and  
frontline practitioners.
Since the 2016 Brussels attacks, threat awareness has 
increased across the board; many important steps 
have been taken, and new measures implemented, 
including in the field of prevention. Furthermore, there 
has been a shift away from hard security measures to 
a more holistic approach to strengthen the resilience 
of vulnerable communities and work with grassroots 
organisations and frontline practitioners. The internal-
external nexus has also been given more prominence, 
not least as a consequence of the security threat posed 
by returning foreign fighters, as some 5.000 Europeans 
travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for the so-called 
Islamic State (ISIS).2 The EU is strengthening counter-
terrorism cooperation with many countries in its 
neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, Turkey 
and North Africa.
 
STATE OF PLAY – NO SILVER BULLET
There is no silver bullet against radicalisation and 
terrorism. However, since 2016 several measures have 
been adopted, at the EU level, to address the hard security 
element of the terrorist threat. 
Intelligence sharing
 
The interoperability of EU member state databases and 
intelligence sharing is crucial for increasing EU security.  
A spring 2016 European Commission report identified 
gaps and shortcomings.3 Since then, the EU has made  
good progress. 
A new directive has reinforced anti-terrorism efforts 
by criminalising travelling within, outside or to the EU 
for terrorist purposes, as well as the facilitation of such 
travel, the collecting of funds to be used for terrorist 
activities, and receiving or carrying out terrorist training.4 
To disrupt access to financial resources used for terrorist 
activities, recent legislation has established tougher  
rules and improved cross-border cooperation against 
money laundering.5
Stricter controls are now in place regarding the movement 
of people both from outside and within the Schengen 
area, thanks to a strengthened Schengen Information 
System6 and an easier exchange of data regarding airlines 
passengers (EU Passenger Name Record directive).7 
Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre also plays 
an important role. A recent regulation has improved 
cooperation between Europol and member states in the 
fight against terrorism, including in the crucial aspect of 
intelligence exchange.8
It was the 2015 Paris attacks that instigated this sharp 
increase in data sharing, as most member states were 
reluctant to exchange sensitive information, or had a 
preference for doing so bilaterally.
Prevention
 
While these counter-terrorism efforts are essential, one 
must also take into consideration a plain fact: security 
and judicial apparatuses have no resources to monitor 
and counter each and every potential threat, no matter 
the legislative facilitations. It is therefore crucial to invest 
in prevention – that is, intervene before the radicalisation 
process happens in the first place.
The EU can make a significant contribution in this respect, 
in terms of material resources, research and coordination. 
In the last few years, the EU has consistently reinforced its 
counter-radicalisation strategy.
The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre 
of Excellence was established in October 2015 by the 
European Commission. It acts as a coordination centre for 
RAN activities and as an information hub for the EU and 
member states on counter-radicalisation. It involves more 
than 2.400 frontline practitioners, community police, 
and prison and probation officers. Bringing frontline 
practitioners together is crucially important for an 
exchange of expertise, experiences and good and  
bad practices.
The Commission has also set up a High-Level Expert 
Group on radicalisation, composed of experts from 
EU institutions and member states, with the aim of 
improving cooperation and further developing EU 
prevention policies. Furthermore, funding for education 
has been channelled through the Erasmus+ programme to 
improve young people’s resilience to radicalisation.
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A strong focus has also been placed on tackling online 
radicalisation. The proliferation of extremist, jihadist 
and violence-inciting websites, blogs and social media 
platforms is a major concern. According to Julian King, EU 
Commissioner for the Security Union, there remain up to 
400 online platforms hosting terrorist content, despite 
efforts to crackdown on this phenomena.9 Terrorists are 
using new technological tools to organise themselves 
and to publish their ideas, while the internet and social 
media platforms have been a key tool for terrorist groups 
to groom, radicalise and recruit supporters, including 
children. This phenomenon has contributed to, in 
particular, the rise in lone-wolf terrorist attacks.10 
In September 2018, the Commission proposed a 
regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist 
content online.11 All internet platforms wanting to offer 
their services in the EU will be subject to clear rules and 
will be required to take proactive measures to prevent 
the dissemination of terrorist content, as defined in the 
recently adopted Directive on Combating Terrorism.12  
The Commission is further asking member states to 
establish dedicated law enforcement agencies to issue 
removal orders. 
The regulation is the latest and most far-reaching of 
a long series of EU initiatives to regulate and restrict 
various types of online content, both legal and illegal. The 
establishment of the ‘Databases of Hashes’ in 2017 was 
also an important step. This instrument is based upon 
the detection efforts carried out by Europol’s Internet 
Referral Unit (IRU), and prevents content published 
on one platform from reappearing on a different one. 
The IRU works with some 150 platforms to tackle the 
dissemination of online terrorist content. According to 
Europol, on average, the content flagged for referrals has 
been removed in 86% of the cases.13
Last but not least, the Commission has devoted EUR 6 
million to online counter-narrative campaigns through 
the Civil Society Empowerment Programme.14
Strengthened external cooperation 
 
Strengthening ties with partner countries, particularly 
in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, Turkey and the 
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Western Balkans, has also become an important part 
of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy. The June 2017 
European Council Conclusions emphasised the need to 
reinforce the Union’s counter-terrorism structures,  
embed the internal-external nexus in EU policies and 
strengthen cooperation with affected countries around 
Europe and with strategic partners.15
In 2016, EU leaders appointed counter-terrorism experts 
in some EU delegations including in Turkey, North Africa, 
the Middle East, the Western Balkans, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. An important part of their mandate is to work  
with local authorities and contribute to joint counter-
terrorism efforts.
Cooperation vis-à-vis returning foreign fighters and 
their families has been important. Of the thousands of 
EU nationals that travelled to Syria and Iraq, it has been 
estimated that around 30% have already returned to their 
home countries. In June 2013, the Council agreed on a 
series of measures to support member states’ efforts to 
tackle returning foreign fighters, including strengthening 
cooperation with third countries.16
The EU furthermore finances different counter-terrorism 
initiatives, including capacity building, security 
sector reform, and provides financial support for the 
implementation of national counter-terrorism strategies 
in a number of partner countries. Many of these national 
strategies have been influenced by the Union’s counter-
terrorism strategy, demonstrating an endorsement of the 
EU approach.17
The EU has also developed counter-terrorism action 
plans with many of the countries, which have led 
to improvement in coordination, monitoring and 
evaluation. However, the depth of cooperation varies 
from case to case. The Western Balkans has been a 
particularly important region and the EU launched a 
‘Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism Initiative’ in 201518, 
which coordinates EU, international and regional efforts 
in the CT field.
PROSPECTS – MANY CHALLENGES REMAIN
Today, Europe is better equipped than it was three years 
ago to deal with the challenges of radicalisation and 
terrorism. Many obstacles, such as a reluctance to share 
intelligence, have been reduced. Nevertheless, while the 
EU’s counter-terrorism efforts are commendable, they 
have, to a large extent, been crisis-driven – reactive rather 
than proactive – although this is gradually changing. But 
serious challenges remain, requiring important action in 
many domains.
Dealing with returning/captured foreign fighters
 
While important measures have been adopted related 
to returning foreign fighters, including increased 
information exchange on identification and the detection 
of suspicious travel, significant challenges remain. 
For example, gathering legal evidence to support 
prosecutions and proving specific actions on  
the battlefield can be very difficult.
This, along with political and security concerns, has made 
EU member states reluctant to repatriate captured foreign 
nationals. Thousands of fighters, women and children are 
in the custody of the US-backed Syrian Defense Forces in 
Syria. However, there are increased calls for Europeans 
to take their nationals back, including from US President 
Donald Trump. 
While many in Europe would prefer to leave their 
nationals in Syria and Iraq, this is not a solution. Prison 
camps are hotbeds for the further spreading of extremist 
ideologies. This was the experience of Camp Bucca in 
Iraq. Nine members of ISIS top command, including the 
group’s leader Ebubekir Baghdadi, did time at the prison, 
radicalising hundreds of other inmates.19 Furthermore, with 
the planned US withdrawal from Syria, camps are likely 
to collapse. This risks fighters making their own way back 
home which poses a serious security/terrorist threat. 
Organised repatriation, beginning with children and 
women is necessary. An international tribunal, along 
the lines of those set up to investigate the atrocities 




Radicalisation in European prisons is also highly 
problematic for some member states, including 
Belgium and France. Two terrorist attacks carried 
out in 2018 (Liège and Strasbourg) were executed 
by individuals radicalised in prison. Many prisons 
are not sufficiently equipped to hold jihadists and 
fully prevent them spreading extremist ideology and 
searching out vulnerable individuals to groom. Prison 
staff lack sufficient training as well. Capacity building 
and exchanging best practices is crucial, including in 
programmes focused on disengagement, de-radicalisation 
and reintegration. This requires greater support and 
funding for frontline practitioners working in prisons. 
While cooperation between police forces and 
intelligence services has increased, there is presently no 
system in place to exchange information between prison 
and probation services. Where there is a record or a risk 
of radicalisation and terrorism, law enforcement and 
intelligence officials across the EU need to be updated 
on prisoners’ profiles and activities while incarcerated, 
so they can be ready when they are released.
Little impact evaluation
 
While the EU has developed numerous issue-specific 
policies and programmes, there is significant overlap. 
Results are mixed. A better monitoring and evaluation of 
policy impact is needed.
This has been confirmed by the European Court of 
Auditors (ECA), which in its Special Report on the 
Commission’s Response to Radicalisation that Leads 
to Terrorism, draws a picture of mostly uncoordinated 
action, which does not fully map EU and national 
practices in this domain. The ECA also points out 
the insufficient qualitative evaluation of counter-
radicalisation programmes.20
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A study conducted in the framework of the  
EU-funded IMPACT project21, devoted to assessing  
the “methodology used in evaluating effects of preventive 
and de-radicalisation interventions”, found that the vast 
majority of actions in this domain did not include any 
empirical collection of qualitative and quantitative  
data to assess impact. In half of the cases, not even a 
theoretical framework was provided, and the  
interventions were merely described in anecdotal terms.22
Need for conceptual clarity to lead action on radicalisation
 
External experts have failed to facilitate the 
Commission’s efforts. Indeed, the scholarly work 
consulted to acquire an operational understanding of 
the phenomenon of radicalisation has “reproduced the 
discord prevalent in the academic literature rather than 
facilitated a shared understanding”.23 Consequently, 
“the very existence and nature of the problem and the 
objectives to be pursued were continually contested”.24
However, if there is no clarity about what is “radical” 
and about the means used by radicals to spread their 
narrative, there can be no clarity on how to fight the 
phenomenon, with which partners, and towards which 
goals – nor how to measure success or failure.
The ideological element of radicalisation also needs 
to be further addressed. The root of the problem is the 
existence of extremist, totalitarian ideologies. While 
in literature there is no universally accepted definition 
of radicalisation, the definition provided by the 
Commission’s DG Home provides a good starting point 
in an EU context, describing radicalisation as a “complex 
phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that 
could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.”25
Based on this definition, two key elements emerge: first of 
all, ideology as the main driver of radicalisation; and second, 
the fact that such an ideology does not need to necessarily 
entail violence to be radical, as long as it is susceptible, 
because of the narrative it promotes, to lead to violence. 
Therefore, it is important to further develop effective 
counter-narratives to extremist ideologies and methods, 
and to effectively communicate them – for example 
through popular role models, such as rappers and 
footballers. Prevention should be at the main focus of 
the EU’s efforts, including providing financial support 
to organisations working on the frontline, especially the 
teachers and youth workers who work with minors. Early 
detection is key. Boosting support for trained frontline 
workers to detect the first signs of radicalisation is crucial. 
A multi-dimensional, joined-up, societal approach with a 
strong focus on long-term prevention is essential.
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